In this chapter, I challenge the notion of culturally sustainable social robotics by arguing that social robots are a socially disruptive technology in the sense identified by philosophers like Ibo van de Poel and colleagues and Jeroen Hopster in recent work. More specifically, I argue that the more humanlike social robots are designed to be, the more socially disruptive they are, and by implication the more they challenge the idea of culturally sustainable social robotics. In order to defend the idea that social robots—especially humanoid social robots—are socially disruptive, I identify some key differences between human-technology interaction (as traditionally conceived) and social human–human interaction (as traditionally conceived). I argue that bringing humanlike social robots into the domain of social interaction requires either that we extend our human norms for social interaction so that they also cover social interaction between humans and robots or that we develop a separate set of norms for social interaction between humans and robots. In making my overall argument, I also contrast and compare the perspectives of Joanna Bryson and David Gunkel, which, although they can seem to be very different, both support the idea that social robots are a socially disruptive technology.
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